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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
Cancer Council Australia (“CCA”) is Australia’s peak national non-
government cancer control organization. CCA advises the Australian Government 
and other Australian non-government bodies on practices and policies to help 
prevent, detect and treat cancer. It also advocates for the rights of cancer patients 
for best treatment and supportive care. CCA works with its members, the eight 
Australian state and territory cancer organizations, to undertake and fund cancer 
research, prevent and control cancer and provide information and support for 
people affected by cancer.
Luigi Palombi is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Sydney’s 
Law School and a member of the academic staff of the Regulatory Institutions 
Network at the Australian National University. Prof Palombi is also admitted to the 
Supreme Courts of the States of South Australia, Victoria, the Northern Territory 
and New South Wales. And also admitted to the Federal and High Courts of 
Australia. He was first admitted to the practice of law in Australia in 1982. He is a 
former law partner of Australia’s largest patent attorney firm, Davies Collison 
Cave. He specialized in patent law in 1986 and in 1993 further specialized by 
focusing his practice on patents directed to the life sciences. He was the attorney-
1
of-record in the first Australian case to challenge the validity of an Australian 
patent containing claims to ‘isolated’ and ‘purified’ nucleotides and amino acids, 
their synthesis by biotechnological processes and their use in medical and scientific 
applications.1 He has also advised clients in Australia and in other parts of the 
world on patents containing such claims. He was awarded a PhD by the University 
of New South Wales in 2005. His doctoral thesis entitled The Patenting of 
Biological Materials in the Context of TRIPS was examined by Professor Peter 
Drahos of the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, Associate 
Professor Ann Monotti of Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, and Emeritus 
Professor William Cornish of Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
Since 2008 he has acted as a pro-bono advisor to CCA during the course of the 
Australian Senate Community Affairs References Committee’s inquiry into the 
impact of gene patents on medical and scientific research and Australia’s healthcare 
system. He has also been invited to present to Australian Members of Parliament 
and Senators on issues concerning patents in the life sciences, particularly gene 
patents. He has made written submissions to a variety of Australian Parliamentary 
inquiries on matters relevant to the life sciences as well as giving evidence in those 
2
1  Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corporation, Federal Court of Australia, NSW 
District Registry NG 106 of 1994.
inquires at the request of the relevant committees. He has given numerous 
interviews on the subject of gene patents on Australian radio and television and is 
often quoted in leading Australian newspapers on the subject. His book, Gene 
Cartels-Biotech Patents in the Age of Free Trade (“Gene Cartels”), has been 
mentioned in speeches made in the Australian Parliament concerning gene patents. 
His book, which is about the history of the patent systems of the United Kingdom, 
Europe and the United States and the patentability of biological materials such as 
genes and proteins, has also been positively received and reviewed. The foreword 
to his book was authored by Nobel laureate, Professor Baruch S. Blumberg. He is 
the author of learned peer-reviewed papers on the subject of gene patents under 
Australian, United States and European patent law. He has been invited to speak on 
patent law at international legal and scientific meetings held in Australia, New 
Zealand, the European Union and the United States.
The issues raised in this appeal are of relevance to CCA and to Prof Palombi, 
to the extent that he is an advisor to CCA on gene patent law and policy, in that its 
outcome, and the reasoning employed in reaching an outcome, may be highly 
influential on developments in contemporary patent law in Australia and, 
importantly, on how such patent law impacts on medical and scientific research 
3
into cancer in Australia. CCA and Professor Palombi have no commercial interest 
in the parties to this action. None of the parties have any association with either 
CCA or Professor Palombi.
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A patent monopoly is a legally enforceable instrument that enables the holder 
to exercise exclusive control within the jurisdiction of the subject matter which 
falls within the scope of any of the claims in the patent document (“the patent”). 
The grant of a patent monopoly, however, is a conditional privilege. It is not 
an irrevocable right. As a conditional privilege, bestowed by the State on the 
holder, it can be revoked. Thus the holder of a patent monopoly may exclusively 
exploit the subject matter of the patent but only within the terms of the grant and 
only if the grant is lawful.
Since the passage by the British Parliament of the Statute of Monopolies in 
1623, monopolies, under Anglo-American law, have been restricted. Under section 
1 of the Statute all monopolies, except for a few specific kinds, were rendered “null 
and of none effect”. One of these exceptions was provided in section 6.2 
5
2  Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 states: “That any Declaration 
before-mentioned shall not extend to any Letters Patents and Grants of Privilege 
for the Term of Fourteen Years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole Working 
or Making of any Manner of new Manufactures within this Realm, to the true and 
first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the Time of 
Making such Letters Patents and Grants shall not use, so as also they be not con-
trary to the Law, nor mischievous to the State, by raising Prices of Commodities at 
home, or Hurt of Trade, or generally inconvenient: The said Fourteen Years to be 
accounted from the Date of the first Letters Patents, or Grant of such Privilege 
hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such Force as they should be, if 
this Act had never been made, and of none other.”
Accordingly a “manner of new manufacture” was patentable subject matter with 
respect to which the grant of a patent monopoly was lawful, provided, the grant (a) 
did not exceed 14 years and (b) its effect did not transgress on the proviso in the 
section. 
British law was received by the North American colonies and although they 
broke away from Great Britain and reorganized themselves as the United States of 
America under its own Constitution in 1787, the Patents Act, 1790 clearly 
borrowed from British patent law3 and the subsequent Patents Acts, 1793, 1836 
and 1952 retained the same association. True it may be that in 1790 the United 
States patent system differed from the British patent system in that it required 
examination of the patent application but, as explained in Professor Palombi’s 
book4, the patentability thresholds were undoubtedly of British legal heritage.
Thus, it has been a long accepted principle of the Anglo-American patent 
system that the grant of a patent monopoly is only lawful if the subject matter of 
the patent is an ‘invention’. Professor P. J. Federico noted:
6
3  Prager, Frank D., Standards of Patentable Invention from 1472 to 1952, The 
University of Chicago Law Review, 20(1), 69-95, 70.
4  Palombi, L., Gene Cartels-Biotech Patents in the Age of Free Trade, (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2009), 9-16.
“There must be a fundamental principle or axiom in patent law 
which might be similar to the axioms or fundamental elements of 
geometry which are stated to be incapable of proof or definition. 
This axiom is that anything new is not necessarily capable of 
being patented; ...”5
Indeed, this principle is the bedrock of Anglo-American patent law. And 
today is contained in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights6 (“TRIPS”) which governs intellectual property within the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”). The WTO’s membership consists of 153 countries 
and includes the United States and Australia, both of which have been members 
since its inception on January 1, 1995.
In addition, the number of international agreements governing free trade 
incorporating aspects of intellectual property law have proliferated since the 
formation of the WTO, with the result that today how patent law is interpreted and 
applied in the United States can have a corresponding influence on patent law in 
other countries. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that since the formation of the 
WTO, and the policy of free trade which it stands for, common legal principles in 
the field of intellectual property law are necessary to strengthen the matrix which 
7
5  Federico P. J., The Concept of Patentable Invention, Journal of the Patent Office 
Society, 32, 118-122, 120 (emphasis added).
6  Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights states: “... patents shall be available for any inventions ....”
brings countries closer together, both economically and politically. To do otherwise 
serves only to undermine the objectives of the WTO. Likewise, there is a growing 
international expectation for the members of the United States Congress and 
Judiciary to acquaint themselves with the intellectual property laws of other 
countries and their development and to take both into account in terms of the 
interpretation and development of the corresponding law of the United States. 
ARGUMENT
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 
AUSTRALIAN PATENT LAW
The relevant statute under Australian patent law is the Patents Act, 1990. The 
Patents Act, 1990 is a Commonwealth Act passed by the Australian Parliament in 
Canberra. The Commonwealth’s power to make laws for “patents of invention” is 
reserved to the Australian Parliament under section 51(xviii) of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act, 1901.
The Patents Act, 1990 superseded the Patents Act, 1952 which superseded 
the Patents Act, 1903, being the first of such legislation after Federation in 1901. 
Prior to Federation, Australia consisted of a number of British colonies. The colony 
of New South Wales was the first in 1788. 
8
British and Australian patent law was directly linked to section 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies, 1623. Accordingly, either the subject matter of a patent was 
a “manner of new manufacture” or the patent was void ab initio. 
The “manner of new manufacture” or ‘invention’ threshold first appeared in a 
British patent statute with the passage of the Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852. 
The threshold was retained in the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, the 
Patents Act, 1902, the Patents and Designs Act, 1919 and the Patents Act, 1949. It 
was not until 1977, with the passage of the Patents Act, 1977 (which was a 
consequence of the United Kingdom ratifying the European Patent Convention, 
1973) that a different test of patentability was adopted by the United Kingdom, and 
even so, the threshold of ‘invention’ is retained, albeit differently expressed.
The Australian 1903 legislation was modeled on the United Kingdom’s 
Patents Act, 1902. Likewise, the Australian 1952 legislation was modeled on the 
United Kingdom’s Patents Act, 1949. 
The first change to the conditions of patentability as originally provided by 
section 6 of the Statute occurred in 1919 when (a) the term of a British (and 
subsequently an Australian) patent monopoly was extended from 14 years to 16 
years (section 17) and (b) chemical substances per se were expressly excluded 
9
from patentability (section 38A). The ban on the patenting of chemical substances 
did not, however, prevent the patenting of processes for the production of chemical 
substances. In this way, British patent law was brought into line with German 
patent law.7 The British government believed this policy to be necessary in order to 
encourage the establishment of a British chemical industry which, with the severe 
shortages of chemicals common place in the United Kingdom throughout the First 
World War, was needed to guard against the reemergent dominance in the British 
market of German chemical companies.8 
The only other change to the conditions of patentability as originally 
provided by section 6 of the Statute occurred in the Australia in 1995 when the 
10
7  The German patent law of 1877 did not permit the patenting of chemical sub-
stances per se. This only changed in 1968.
8  The United States government instead confiscated German-owned US chemical 
and other patents, trademarks and copyrights and established the American Chemi-
cal Foundation (“ACF”). The ACF then either licensed or sold the US patents to 
US-owned companies. One of the major beneficiaries of this policy was the Ster-
ling Drug Co., which acquired the famous ‘Bayer’ trademark as well as Bayer’s US 
patents and factories. See Vaughan, F.W. (1919), Suppression and Non-working of 
Patents, With Special Reference to the Dye and Chemical Industries, The American 
Economic Review, 9 (4), 693–700. Also Steen, K. (2001), Patents, Patriotism, and 
“Skilled in the Art”: USA v The Chemical Foundation, 1923–1926’, Isis, 92, 91–
122.
term of a Australian patent was extended from 16 years to 20 years by effect of 
Australia’s membership of the WTO.9
What can be deduced from this brief history of Australian patent law is that 
the bedrock of patentability is ‘invention’. Over a period of nearly 400 years the 
only significant change in the operation of this principle as it was originally written 
(apart from briefly banning chemical substances from patentability between 1919 
and 1949 in the United Kingdom) has been to increase the patent term from 14 
years to 20 years. As such it can be stated with confidence that unless the subject of 
a patent is truly an invention, the grant of a patent monopoly is unlawful.10
Although the ban on patenting of chemical substances was repealed by the 
Patents Act, 1949 UK, the same legislation reemphasized the overriding of 
importance of this principle by expressly prohibiting the grant of a patent 
monopoly over any substance as “found in nature”.11
11
9  The term of a British patent changed to 20 years with the passage of the Patents 
Act, 1977 (UK).
10  Section 18(1)(a) Patents Act, 1990 (AU) states: “… an invention is a patentable 
invention for the purposes of a standard patent if the invention, so far as claimed in 
any claim: (a) is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section!6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies”.
11  Section 4(7) Patents Act, 1949 (UK) states: “Where a complete specification 
claims a new substance, the claim shall be construed as not extending to that sub-
stance when found in nature.”
The crucial question, of course, is: what is an ‘invention’? and in the context 
of section 18(1)(a) Patents Act, 1990 (being the current subject matter provision) 
the correct inquiry for answering this question, according to the High Court of 
Australia (equivalent to the US Supreme Court) in National Research Development 
Corporation v The Commissioner of Patents (“NRDC”), is this: 
“Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the princi-
ples which have been developed for the application of s. 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies?”
II. ARE ‘ISOLATED’ BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS ‘INVENTIONS’?
As Professor Palombi points out in his book Gene Cartels, the bedrock 
principle of ‘invention’ binds the patent laws of Britain, the United States and 
Australia together through a common heritage. True it is that today each has its 
own patents legislation and within each of these the thresholds of patentability are 
expressed in their own way, such that it cannot be said that the legislations are the 
same. However, regardless of the language used, the intent is the same. At its most 
fundamental, a patent, regardless of jurisdiction, concerns, and only concerns, an 
invention. Thus, although the courts in each jurisdiction have developed their own 
unique jurisprudence on the issue of invention, what emerges from a study of them 
are similarities in approaches. One of these is that the discovery of a naturally 
12
occurring thing, a natural phenomenon, in the parlance of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
is excluded from patentability because it is not an invention.
The distinction between discovery on the one hand and invention on the 
other has, however, been problematic. And this is true in each of these three 
common law jurisdictions. Clearly, there have been significant technological 
developments since 1623 when the phrase ‘manner of new manufacture’ was first 
coined and, with respect to each of these developments, the courts in each 
jurisdiction has had to apply their respective patent laws in the context of these 
developments, while at the same time ensuring that the original intent encapsulated 
within the meaning of this phrase was maintained. These technological 
developments have, at times, caused considerable controversy over precisely where 
to draw the line and how to draw the line between ‘discovery’ on the one hand and 
‘invention’ on the other.
The High Court of Australia in NRDC, a celebrated judicial authority in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, attempted to do this in the 
context of an Australian patent application which claimed, as an invention, a 
process that used a well known herbicide in a new way so as to produce a new and 
useful result, namely, the herbicide killed certain weeds but not the crops over 
13
which the herbicide was applied. The Court was asked to consider whether such a 
result, being an ‘effect’ (in the field of agriculture) and not a tangible physical 
product was, at law, capable of satisfying the patentable subject matter test of 
‘manner of new manufacture’. The Court answered that question in the affirmative. 
In doing so the Court made some pertinent statements about the distinction 
between discovery and invention. The most relevant, in the context of the issues 
raised in this appeal, is this:
“There may indeed be a discovery without invention - either be-
cause the discovery is of some piece of abstract information with-
out any suggestion of a practical application of it to a useful end, or 
because its application lies outside the realm of “manufacture”.  
But where a person finds out that a useful result may be produced 
by doing something which has not been done by that procedure be-
fore, his claim for a patent is not validly answered by telling him 
that although there was ingenuity in his discovery that the materials 
used in the process would produce the useful result no ingenuity 
was involved in showing how the discovery, once it had been 
made, might be applied.”
This decision remains, despite having been handed down in 1959, the 
leading authority on patentable subject matter in Australian jurisprudence.
What is noteworthy about this passage is the distinction which the Court 
draws between the “discovery of materials” on the one hand and the use of those 
14
materials “in the process” on the other. The first, in the opinion of the Court, is not 
an invention. The latter, however, is.
This distinction is central to this appeal on the issue of the patentability of 
the composition claims in issue.
The composition claims are to biological materials derived from human 
beings. No one invented them. They are not, therefore, the product of humankind. 
That they have been identified and linked to specific human forms of cancer, 
namely, breast and ovarian cancers, is not an act of invention. It is an act of 
discovery. Likewise, that they have been the subject of human manipulation 
through the application of scientific processes leading to their isolation from the 
human body or their synthetic production via some biotechnological process does 
not transform either what they are or what they do. Neither in an isolated form, nor 
as cDNA, nor even as purified nor synthesized proteins are these materials in any 
way, shape or form significantly different in structure or function to the 
corresponding materials as found in nature. However, that they may be used as 
components in a process, method or product is, as the Court pointed out in NRDC, 
another issue entirely. So long as the patent claim is to a specific and well defined 
15
process (as opposed to a claim to ‘any’ process12) or method13 that meets the 
patentability criteria of novelty, inventive step and utility then, according to NRDC, 
the process or method is patentable subject matter even if the end product is ‘an 
effect’ and not a tangible physical product.
NRDC has been often cited by IP Australia (the Australian Patent Office) as 
supportive of its policy of allowing patent claims over “isolated and purified gene 
sequences”.14 Indeed, throughout the course of a two year inquiry15 conducted by 
the Australian Senate over the impact of gene patents on Australia’s healthcare 
system,16 IP Australia cited NRDC, arguing that its reasoning sanctioned a “broad 
scope of the expression Manner of Manufacture”.17 The line of argument used by 
IP Australia is similar to a line of argument used by proponents of similar patent 
16
12  It is arguable that a claim to ‘any’ process, method or product is a de facto claim 
to the biological materials themselves.
13  This Amicus brief does not address the method claims in issue in this appeal.
14  Submission by IP Australia to the Australian Senate Community Affairs Refer-
ences Committee’s Inquiry into Gene Patents: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/gene_patents/submissions/sub1
9.pdf 
15  The Inquiry was ordered on November 11, 2008. The Senate Community Af-
fairs References Committee undertook the Inquiry. The Committee’s Report was 
presented to the Australian Senate on November 26, 2010.
16  http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/gene_patents_43/index.htm
17  Op cit 14 at page 13.
claims in the United States. The difference being that they cite the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Diamond v Chakrabarty instead.
However, neither NRDC nor Chakrabarty is supportive of the patentability 
of the composition claims in issue. 
First, although NRDC approved the patentability of new and useful processes 
that produced a beneficial ‘effect’ in the field of agriculture, it expressly 
disapproved of the patentability of the “fruit” grown with the benefit of that effect. 
As the High Court of Australia held: “However advantageously man may alter the 
conditions of growth, the fruit is still not produced by his action.”
Secondly, while Chakrabarty sanctioned a “broad construction” of section 
101 (Patents Act, 1952 US), it also emphasized the limits on that construction by 
endorsing the well established principle that “laws of nature, physical phenomena 
and abstract ideas” are not patentable subject matter. It also provided guidance on 
how that limitation should be applied in the context of patents concerning 
biological materials derived from natural sources. Importantly, the Court found that 
the genetic modification performed on the naturally occurring bacterium “produced 
a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature” (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court found that the new bacterium had 
17
the “potential for significant utility”. The Court cited (with approval) the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co so as to 
make the point that where there is no difference between the artificial biological 
material and its naturally occurring equivalent, either in what the biological 
material is or the function it performs, then the artificial biological material is 
unpatentable subject matter because it is structurally and functional 
indistinguishable from the thing from which it was derived.
The ‘isolation’ of a naturally occurring biological material does not change 
either the structure or function of that material. It does not lead to the creation of a 
new biological material which exhibits markedly different characteristics from 
anything found in nature. Quite to the contrary, while it may be ‘new’ in the sense 
that it has been removed from its natural environment and modified during the 
process of its isolation, the end result is something which is structurally and 
functionally equivalent.18 This fact, as was shown in Amgen, Inc v Chugai 
Pharmaceutical Co and Genetics Institute, Inc, has been long known. After an 
extensive investigation into the nature of the claimed invention, in that case 
18
18  Amgen, Inc v Chugai Pharmaceutical Co and Genetics Institute, Inc 13 
U.S.P.Q.2D 1737 (1989).
erythropoietin, a human made protein, and the biotechnological processes used in 
synthesising it, the presiding Federal Magistrate held:
“…the overwhelming evidence, including Amgen’s own admis-
sions, establishes that uEPO and rEPO are the same product. The 
EPO gene used to produce rEPO is the same EPO gene as the 
human body uses to produce uEPO. (Tr. 25, 14). The amino acid 
sequences of human uEPO and rEPO are identical. (Chugai’s 
Req. Adm. to Amgen No. 436; Egrie Dep. Tr. 2-165). There are 
no known differences between the secondary structure of rEPO 
produced in a CHO cell and EPO produced in a human kidney. 
(Chugai’s Req. Adm. to Amgen No. 437)…. Amgen’s own scien-
tists have concluded that by all criteria examined, rEPO is the 
‘equivalent to the natural hormone.’ In particular, they noted that 
the uEPO preparation had an equivalent biological activity in the 
RIA and bioassays. (DX 323, pp. 217-218). Amgen’s Product Li-
cense Application to the FDA states that all ‘physical tests per-
formed on both r-HuEPO and u-HuEPO ... show these proteins to 
be indistinguishable’; that r-HuEPO and u-HuEPO are ‘indistin-
guishable in their biological and immunological properties’; and 
that testing ‘confirms the similarity of the secondary and tertiary 
protein structures of r-HuEPO and u-HuEPO as predicted by the 
equivalence of their immunological and biological activities.’ 
(DX 328, pp. 762, 782, 789)”
It is noteworthy that the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (which 
served as the court of last resort in the United Kingdom until the establishment of 
the Supreme Court in 2009) in Kirin-Amgen, Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd 
held invalid patent claims to the synthetic erythropoietin precisely because it was 
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identical in structure and function and, therefore, indistinguishable from 
erythropoietin as produced by the human body.19
It is also noteworthy that in its Gene Patent Report (presented to the 
Australian Parliament on November 26, 2010) the Australian Senate Committee 
stated:
“While the Committee acknowledges IP Australia’s defence of the 
current approach as being analogous to other classes of patents, 
such as chemical products, the Committee strongly rejects the rea-
soning which says that, for the purposes of the Patents Act 1990 
(the Act), genetic information that is ‘isolated’ from its naturally 
occurring state in the human body may be classed as an invention, 
and therefore properly be the subject of a patent (where the other 
requirements of patentability are satisfied).”20
The forceful rejection of IP Australia’s reasoning is significant. It supports 
the view that ‘isolation’ is insufficient, under Australian patent law, to transform a 
product of nature into patentable subject matter.
20
19  Kirin-Amgen, Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 667.
20  Australian Senate’s Gene Patent Report: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/gene_patents_43/report/index.ht
m (at page xii, emphasis added).
III. ARE SYNTHETICALLY MADE BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 
‘INVENTIONS’?
In their original form and in their natural environments there can be no 
question that the materials in issue in this appeal are naturally occurring biological 
materials. That these same materials can be isolated, that is, removed from their 
natural environment and modified as a result of the process employed in their 
isolation, does not change what they are nor what they do. Therefore, they are not 
sufficiently changed in either their structure or function to distinguish them from 
their naturally occurring origins in any material way, shape or form.
However, in an isolated form and so modified by the process of isolation, 
these biological materials are, in this state, artificial. But artificiality is not and has 
never been the sole criterion of patentability. Rather, it is but one of a number of 
criteria used to assess whether the ‘invention’ threshold has been reached. 
Chakrabarty makes this clear. And the reasoning applied in Chakrabarty (and in a 
consistent line of U.S. Supreme Court authority both before and since) is equally 
applicable to biological materials derived from a natural source but synthetically 
made. 
cDNA is a biological material but it does not exist in nature. And it is 
synthetically made. Yet, are the composition claims in issue here, to the extent that 
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they might apply to cDNAs, patentable subject matter? Amicus United States 
argues they are. Plaintiff-Appellees argue the issue is immaterial. However, putting 
this point to one side, for the sake of completeness, and since the issue has been 
raised by Amicus United States, the question is addressed below.
While cDNAs are artificial, in the context of the composition claims in issue, 
it is argued here that they are not patentable subject matter for a number of reasons.
First, the genetic information contained in the cDNA is identical to the 
corresponding genetic information contained in the DNA of the human gene from 
which it has been sourced. There is, in fact, no point of structural or informational 
distinction.
Secondly, unlike the genetically modified bacterium in Chakrabarty which 
was, as a result of those modifications, able to degrade crude oil, a function 
unprecedented anywhere in nature, a cDNA containing the same corresponding 
genetic information as contained in a human gene (or a fragment of that gene) 
cannot be said to perform an unprecedented function from any found in nature. 
There is, in fact, no point of functional distinction.
A Bill, the Patents Amendment (Human Genes and Biological Materials) Bill 
2010, to amend the Australian Patents Act, 1990 was introduced in the Australian 
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Parliament on November 24, 2010. The Bill seeks to apply the reasoning in 
Chakrabarty so as to expressly preclude, among other things, such biological 
materials as these from patentability. 
Specifically, the Bill proposes to amend subsection 18(2). 
Currently the subsection reads as follows:
“Section 18(2) Human beings, and the biological processes for 
their generation, are not patentable inventions.”
The amended subsection as proposed in the Bill reads as follows:
“Section 18(2) The following are not patentable inventions:
(a) human beings, and the biological processes for their 
generation; and
(b) biological materials including their components and 
derivatives, whether isolated or purified or not and however 
made, which are identical or substantially identical to such 
materials as they exist in nature.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill states:
“The purpose of this Bill is to advance medical and scientific re-
search and the diagnosis, treatment and cure of human illness and 
disease by enabling doctors, clinicians and medical and scientific 
researchers to gain free and unfettered access to biological mate-
rials, however made, that are identical or substantially identical to 
such materials as they exist in nature. These biological materials 
even if they have been isolated, purified or synthetically made 
have not been transformed from products of nature into products 
of humankind.”
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The Bill does not seek to change Australian patent law. Rather, it seeks to see 
it properly applied as it was originally intended.
IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Throughout the course of the Australian Senate’s Inquiry into Gene Patents, 
IP Australia, the chief defender of the patent policy under the Committee’s 
scrutiny, argued that a legislative amendment to Australia’s Patents Act, 1990 of 
the kind proposed in the Patents Amendment (Human Genes and Biological 
Materials) Bill 2010 could possibly contravene both TRIPS and the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement (“AUSFTA”).21 
In its submission to the Inquiry, on TRIPS, it stated:
“IP Australia assesses applications for gene patents by applying 
the same patentability requirements as for all other applications, 
irrespective of their technological field. Introducing a limited 
term of protection, higher thresholds of patentability or a general 
exclusion specifically for gene technologies may breach 
obligations under the TRIPS agreement.”
In its submission to the Inquiry, on AUSFTA, it stated:
“AUSFTA is a major bilateral trade agreement with the United 
States that Australia entered into in 2004 ... AUSFTA does not 
expand the exclusions from patentability allowed under the 
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21  Op cit 14 at page 24.
TRIPS Agreement. The agreement does require both parties to 
seek to reduce differences in law and practices between their re-
spective systems and participate in international patent harmoni-
sation [sic] efforts.”
In response to these statements the Committee stated in the Gene Patents 
Report:
“In relation to potential barriers to creating an express prohibition 
on gene patents, despite the possible difficulty of fashioning 
legislative provisions that would be sufficiently precise, effective 
and of enduring effect, the Committee does not agree with the 
view that it is not feasible or necessarily possible to expressly 
prohibit gene patents, as the ALRC concluded in its 2004 report. 
Nor did the Committee regard the need for compliance with 
international agreements such as TRIPS to be insurmountable if 
Australia were to seek to enact a prudent exclusion for gene 
patents. The Committee believes that Government should not feel 
prevented from enacting express exemptions of certain subject 
matter in future where this is justified by sufficient evidence.”
The Report did not, however, contain a recommendation to the effect 
proposed in the Bill. Part of the reasoning given in the Report for not doing so was 
the Committee’s recognition that:
“ ... the introduction of the Bill to the Senate will provide a 
further, and much-needed, opportunity for the arguments and 
questions around the impacts and effectiveness of an express 
prohibition on gene patents to be considered.”
The Committee was aware of the litigation which has given rise to this 
Appeal and of the views expressed by Amicus United States. Indeed the uncertainty 
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felt over the outcome of this Appeal and the potential for a further appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court was of importance to the Committee.22
Given that TRIPS and AUSFTA are binding on Australia and the United 
States, it is appropriate for Australian patent law and pertinent developments in that 
law to be taken into account with respect to the issues raised in this Appeal.
CONCLUSION
The judgement of the district court should be affirmed.
Dated:  December 3, 2010.
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22  The Committee stated: “The Committee understands that, in the event that this 
ruling [of the US District Court] is mirrored in the judgement of a higher court, it 
will become binding on the practices of the USPTO. In such circumstances, and 
assuming there was no change to the Act in the meantime, the Committee would 
expect that the Government and IP Australia will act quickly to update Australian 
patent law and practice to conform with the US approach, particularly given evi-
dence concerning the importance that IP Australia places on international harmoni-
sation [sic] of patent systems and Australia's obligations under AUSFTA.”
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